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Abstract 
 
 
This article deals with international negotiations in multinational enterprises (MNEs), in 
particular the HQ-subsidiary negotiations. The theoretical part of the intercultural negotiation 
framework (Ott, 2011) highlights the potential for MNE negotiation analysis. An empirical 
investigation into Japanese MNE negotiations strengthens the theory. Different time 
perceptions and strategies influence HQ-subsidiary negotiations. The outcome of the fuzzy 
set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) shows that an integrative approach needs a 
higher offer with a margin of at least 20% to cover for relationship building, patience and 
trust.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Many international negotiations fail, and when they succeed, the relationships which 
develop could falter later and the origins of the failure may lie in the previous negotiations. A 
mismatch in understanding basic negotiation patterns of different cultures is often the reason 
for subsequent failure, as shown in the literature. Salacuse (1999) states that, for Americans, 
the negotiation ends in a contract, whereas, for cultures from the Far East, the signing of a 
contract marks the start of a relationship. There is little systematic analysis of the negotiation 
behavior between MNEs and subsidiaries. This article deals with opening the black box of 
international negotiations in MNEs and in particular those with Japanese HQs and their 
subsidiaries.  
 
This article contributes to the literature in two ways. First, the intercultural negotiation 
framework facilitates the analysis of international negotiation behavior between the 
headquarters of MNEs and their international counterparts in subsidiaries. Second, the article 
links theory and evidence. The empirical focus upon Japanese MNE executives regarding 
their international negotiation experience gives a fascinating insight into the workings of 
Japanese MNEs (Tokyo HQ – international subsidiaries). To ensure confidentiality and adjust 
to a small number of cases (Ragin, 2000), fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
(fsQCA) combines an in-depth understanding of ethnographic interviews with a quantitative 
approach. The theoretical analysis and the empirical investigation provide scientific evidence 
for the relevance of the initial offer to anticipate a cooperative strategy, and in this way 
contribute to knowledge about negotiations within MNEs headquartered in the Far East. 
Furthermore, combining negotiation analysis with a fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis shows potential for further research.  
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2. Negotiating in Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) 
 
Negotiation analysis in an organizational context is relatively young (Putnam, 2004) and 
would need more focus on multinational enterprises, since social interactions, negotiations 
and contracts are intertwined in organizations.  
 
2.1. International Negotiation Analysis in Multinational Enterprises  
 
An analysis of international negotiations in MNEs needs to consider the specific nature of 
MNEs compared to other forms of organization (Harzing and Sorge, 2003).  Harzing and 
Sorge (2003) highlight that internationalization strategies are overall concepts of extending 
operations from domestic base to other countries as well as practices of corporate control in 
different cultural contexts in subsidiaries influence MNE negotiations. MNEs in the USA, 
Europe and Japan have different modes of control and ways of communicating, organizing 
and negotiating. Differences in mental models (Liu, Friedman, Barry, Gelfand, and Zhan, 
2012) affect intercultural negotiations in MNEs. The specifics of negotiations within a 
reactive MNE (with headquarters in a reactive country such as Japan, Korea and China) 
require further exploration.  
 
The research questions derive from the negotiation literature and the specifics of the MNE 
context:  How do the MNE negotiations come to a collaborative outcome in light of 
differences between HQ and subsidiary cultures? Why do Japanese (reactive) MNEs include 
higher margins in their initial offers in negotiations?  
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2.2. Intercultural negotiation framework and the reactive negotiator 
 
Distinct from previous frameworks, Ott (2011) proposes a game theoretical framework for 
different cultural negotiation styles in order to highlight co-operation and conflict that relate 
to activity types (linear-active, multi-active and reactive negotiators - LMR). This approach 
emphasizes the likely clash of cultures in nine scenarios. Ott (2011) uses Buyer-seller 
experiments to support the analysis. To evaluate this framework further for organizational 
situations, cooperation and conflict between specific cultural combinations are of particular 
interest. HQ-subsidiary negotiations provide a research setting to study how the relationship 
between a reactive MNE and LMR subsidiary develop and unfold. 
 
Ott (2011) connects cultural differences in bargaining behavior to the range of the initial 
offer. She shows that the players’ strategies relate to the frequency of rejection and the 
valuation of time. The properties of the model comprise the linear-active, multi-active and 
reactive type of player: 
(a) The linear-active player has a short-term perspective 0→Lδ . The player poses a 
concession with a short delay and the costs of bargaining cL are low due to the short time 
horizon. Acceptance and rejection lead to the end of the game either with agreement or break-
up. 
(b) The multi-active player has a medium length term orientation 1→Mδ . The bargaining 
costs are high cH, and the length of negotiations is longer than with the linear-active player. 
(c) The reactive bargaining type has a long-term perspective 1→Rδ . The delay between 
offers can be long 1→∆ . The bargaining costs are high cH(t), and outside options are 
relevant even after acceptance t ={0, ∞ }.  
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This article offers a new perspective by using a MNE HQ-subsidiary setting in table 1 
below, instead of nine buyer-seller scenarios (Ott, 2011). The payoffs are MNE (HQ-
subsidiary) utility functions cpU ii −= )()( δδ , i=[L,M,R]. 
 
Table 1 here 
 
The international negotiation analysis combines the constructs of a negotiation process 
with the cultural types of the negotiators in an MNE. Figure 1 below positions the MNE 
headquarters of a reactive cultural background and the respective subsidiary in order to show 
the cultural influence on negotiation style, strategy and outcome. The negotiation style in 
case of a reactive negotiator will be patient, win-win- and trust-oriented. The time horizon 
contributes to the cooperation and conflicts in terms of initial offers, negotiation strategy 
(costs, length), concessions, disagreement and cooperation.  
 
Figure 1 here 
 
 
2.3. International Negotiation Analysis of Reactive MNEs  
 
The correlation between the trust building, patience, win-win strategy approach and the 
length of negotiations of reactive negotiators is in contrast to a short-term or haggling 
approach. This strategic approach for a MNE setting shows the complexities when the 
analysis adds the cultural negotiation strategies to the equation. In the context of MNE 
negotiations, the focus is on reactive types either as HQ of an MNE or as host of an MNE in a 
negotiation. 
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The Japanese HQ sends their managers to the subsidiaries (Harzing and Sorge, 2004) in a 
country of predominantly linear-active (USA), multi-active (Middle East) or reactive (Far 
East) employees. The following figure 2 shows the moves of the players and the strategic 
options for the players.  
 
Figure 2 here 
 
The diagram above shows the initial proposal of the MNE HQ player and the reaction 
functions of the host player and then the move of the MNE player as a reaction to the second 
player. The time in the negotiation is on the x-axis and the proposals/offers are on the y-axis. 
The concessions and the negotiation process over time reflect the bargaining process between 
different cultures. The agreement points and the out-of-equilibrium paths for the three types 
of negotiators with a reactive HQ visualize the cooperation and conflict.  
 
The negotiation analysis for a reactive HQ and linear-active, multi-active or reactive 
subsidiaries shows that at time Lδ  the linear-active host will accept a proposal of the reactive 
HQ, whereas it takes Mδ time for a multi-active to accept a reactive proposal. The 
equilibrium of two reactive negotiators shows how long it would take to build up trust for an 
acceptable proposal. The first proposition deals with these paths: 
 
Proposition 1: If a reactive MNE HQ makes the initial offer with a margin of x% to 
include the coverage of the bargaining horizon,  then the cultural values of the host will lead 
to a dynamic bargaining process with pre-mature acceptance (linear-active), break-down of 
negotiations (multi-active) or equilibrium (reactive).  
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For linear-active and multi-active subsidiaries, the initial proposal of a reactive HQ does 
not fit to their private values for the bargaining process. The reactive player will not reject 
due to losing face, but will delay the bidding process. It is too costly for the linear-active to 
continue when the margins do not cover the longer time horizon. The multi-active host will 
have a longer horizon than the linear-active, but will make more concessions and negotiate 
more emotionally than the reactive, with potential for conflict. In an organizational context, 
players can re-negotiate in these scenarios.  
 
Proposition 2: If the subsidiary moves first in a host-offer game, then the reactive MNE 
will need to hold out in order to build up trust in an integrative approach as a signal to the 
hosts. It pays off to adapt to an international strategy for win-win solutions.  
 
These propositions highlight the international negotiation patterns for the empirical 
investigation and fuzzy set QCA. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
Interviews give insight into the depth of reactive negotiation patterns in Japanese MNE to 
discover hidden processes. HQ-subsidiary negotiations provide a bigger picture of strategies 
and outcomes. Each interviewee delves into a long negotiation experience and shares hardest 
negotiation, bargaining strategies and height of initial offers with the interviewer. The fuzzy 
set Qualitative Comparative Analysis determines the cross-case analysis and the robustness 
of the results. The set theoretic approach provides a tool to analyze small-N cases and derives 
insights for the in-depth analysis of complex negotiations. 
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3.1. Sample and data collection 
 
The participants are senior executives with experience as negotiators at the various 
functional and hierarchical levels in the HQ and subsidiaries. 22 participants from the HQ 
and subsidiaries make up 16 cases of HQ-host negotiators and 6 cases from host-HQ 
perspectives. The research process addresses the difficulty of getting access to sensitive data 
in a Japanese MNE. An interviewer from within the firm opens up information channels and 
supports trust-building with an ethnographic style interview. The majority of MNE managers 
abroad are Japanese, and their subsidiaries are in the USA (linear), UK, Germany (linear-
active), France, Italy (multi-active) and China (reactive). The research considers the cultural 
background in two questions about the interviewees’ original and target culture: a) where the 
respondents were coming from and b) in which country they are working. Japanese MNEs 
mostly send their own staff into their subsidiaries on a managerial level. This observation is 
relevant for the way the cultural and learned behavior unfolds. To keep the organizational 
culture constant is important and, therefore, the case analysis is in one MNE to study the 
cultural activity types, ceteris paribus.  
 
The participants answered questions connected to the framework (Ott, 2011) and 
highlighted the importance of international negotiations, their hardest negotiations, their 
strategies, the height of initial proposal (+5%-10%; +10-20% or +50%) and whether they use 
emotion, logic or patience.  
 
The coding of the answers transfers the theoretical constructs and questions into the 
following conditions for the fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA): 
a) Adaptation to an International Strategy compared to domestic negotiations  
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b) Win-Win Strategy 
c) Patience as a Strategy 
d) Initial Offer – Outcome correlation 
  
The data of the cases are anonymous. The cases represent the influence of culture from a 
home and host country perspective. This classification goes both ways as there are managers 
who grew up in the USA, Germany, Belgium and China and who now work for this MNE in 
the subsidiaries.  
 
3.2. Fuzzy Set Analysis 
 
Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) based on Ragin (1987, 1997, 2000, 
2008) is ideal to show the causal effects between first offer, strategy, bargaining process and 
patience. This method combines qualitative and quantitative methodology to improve the 
analysis of cases with small-N or large-N numbers. Geckhamer (2011) and Kvist (2007) use 
fsQCA to analyze and classify types. Woodside et al (2011) and Woodside and Zhang (2013) 
use it for consumer behavior and provide new insights into behavioral issues. The results of 
recent articles (Geckhamer, 2011, Kvist, 2007; Pajunen, 2008; Schneider, Schulze-Bentrop 
and Paunescu 2010) show the strength of a configurational approach. Palmer (2006) 
emphasizes that qualitative methods are appropriate for those dimensions of organizational 
behavior which researchers find difficult to measure and that rigorous protocols now exist for 
conducting qualitative research (Ragin, 2000). Davis, Morrill, Hayagreeva and Soule (2008) 
similarly suggest that fsQCA may help generate knowledge of the organization of 
information and people across time and space. 
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In international business, Pajunen (2008) and Schneider et al (2010) use fsQCA for 
investigations into the institutional side of foreign direct investment and institutional capital 
of high-tech firms with regard to export performance. These insights into fsQCA strengthen 
the analysis of the negotiation model of MNE HQ-Subsidiary relationships. The 
configuration of cultural types in Japanese MNE negotiations fits into the fsQCA approach.  
 
3.3. Calibration of conditions and outcome 
 
The calibration of the responses of the interviews into fuzzy set properties and conditions 
follows in the next step. The table below shows the classification of the conditions into the 
membership of the sets (<0.25; 0.25 to 0.55; 0.55 to 0.8 and 0.8>). The break-points show 
whether the condition belongs to an empty set <0.25 to a medium 0.25 to 0.55; 0.55 to 0.8 or 
to a full set 0.8>, as appropriate for a fuzzy-set approach. 
 
Table 2 here 
 
The answers of the interviews belong to cases of negotiation behavior and show the degree 
of the membership in a set of each condition. The conditions reflect the coding of the 
interviews. Geckhamer (2011) emphasizes that cases with strong membership in a 
configuration are the most relevant consistent and inconsistent cases. The coverage relates to 
the overlap of the conditions of the joint sets. Consistency and coverage help the 
interpretation of results (Ragin, 2008; Greckhamer, 2011). Therefore, the consistency 
measure should be close to 1 to enable inferences that a subset exists, indicating that all cases 
that share a condition also share the outcome. The consistency benchmark is 0.90 for 
necessary and sufficient condition (Greckhamer, 2011) which is higher than Ragin’s (2006) 
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consistency benchmark of 0.85. Raw coverage is the overall coverage of a combination that 
may overlap with other combinations and should be below 0.50.  
 
4. Results 
 
4.1. Qualitative Results 
 
It is notable that, in the cases of negotiations between the Japanese HQ and cross-cultural 
subsidiary, the HQ-subsidiary negotiations feature patience, listening, collaborative strategies 
and consensus (see direct quotes below): 
 
When we had a consensus built a scheme of global organization together with US, EU, Japan and 
Asia. I tried to understand mutual power-balance and our thought, led them to desirable meeting point 
(C12 Japan/USA) 
 
Almost all negotiations seem quite hard in the beginning, however, reasonable logic, consistency 
and good faith can solve almost every very tough looking negotiation.(C13 Japan/USA, France, Italy) 
 
Extreme ‘Patience’ is important. I started higher offer, but finally reach agreement that is close to 
counterpart. (Case 9 Japan/Singapore) 
 
When you do not fully understand the view of the other party, then listen, ask open question, create 
atmosphere where they speak, open up, further facilitate the discussion (C 20 Germany, USA/Japan, 
USA).  
 
4.2. FsQCA Results 
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In line with previous research (Ragin, 2006; Pajunen, 2008; Schneider et al. 2010), the 
causal conditions (INTSTRAT, WINSTRAT, PAT) are necessary conditions for the outcome, 
first offer (FOFFREA). Table 3 below shows the outcome. The consistency and raw coverage 
levels are significant.  
 
Table 3 here 
 
With the ‘First Offer including 20% margin’ as an outcome, there is a high consistency of 
0.96. A high consistency measure (score between 0.91 and1) means that a condition or a 
combination of conditions is necessary or almost always necessary (Ragin, 2006). The model 
considers the first offer as dependent on adaptation to an international strategy, win-win 
strategy and patience, such that first offer = f (patience, int. strat, win-win). Both the HQ-
Subsidiary and the Subsidiary-HQ negotiations need this approach.  
 
Truth table Analysis. The truth table analysis shows consistency of 0.86 and coverage of 
0.80 as a logical remainder with intermediate, parsimonious and complex solution. These 
strong results show clear evidence that ‘adapting to an international strategy’ is necessary for 
the outcome. The truth table analysis reveals higher consistency for the negation of win-win 
(0.9) and the negation of patience (0.96) leading to an overall consistency of 0.87 when 
adopting an international strategy.  
 
Table 4 here 
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Empirical importance. Ragin (2006) suggests the use of raw coverage and unique 
coverage to assess empirical importance. Schneider, Schulze-Bentrop and Paunescu (2010) 
show in their findings that raw coverage refers to the size of overlaps between the causal 
condition and the outcome sets. Additionally, their analysis uses unique coverage to control 
the overlapping explanations by partitioning the raw coverage.  
 
The total coverage of all causal paths is 0.8. Most of the outcome is covered with the 
causal paths. In Japanese MNEs, negotiators use the reactive strategy to adapt to the 
counterpart in both HQ-Subsidiary and Subsidiary-HQ negotiations. The analysis suggests 
that the negations of win-win (WINSTRAT) and patience (PAT) are relevant when 
negotiators adopt the international strategy or when Japanese management adapts to an 
international strategy.  
 
Necessary conditions. Regarding the necessary conditions, the causal conditions show that 
the combination of all three conditions is necessary (0.96), and WINSTRAT in combination 
with INTSTRAT are necessary conditions for the outcome of a reactive first offer (+20%). 
 
Table 5 here 
 
The joint set of all conditions - win-win, international strategy and patience - has very high 
consistency (0.96) and coverage (0.53) levels. The joint sets of two conditions, especially 
international strategy with patience and win-win with international strategy, have high levels 
of consistency (0.90 and 0.96, respectively) and coverage (0.61 and 0.58, respectively). 
Figure 3 of XY-plots for the joint sets with consistency above 0.88 supports the identification 
of asymmetric relationship for complex causal paths in international negotiations. 
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Figure 3 here 
 
If negotiators deviate from a reactive, Japanese style adaptation to other strategies, then 
the result is a reduction in win-win and patience with implications for the first offer.  
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
5.1. Theoretical Implication 
 
The intercultural negotiation framework (Ott, 2011) provides for a framework for the 
analysis of MNE negotiations. Insights into the agreement and disagreement points in 
negotiations in MNEs help the prescription of behavior in MNEs. Theoretically, a 
collaborative approach in MNEs is supported: an integrative negotiation process, trust-
building approach and patience tend to reach solutions. Sending Japanese HQ-managers to 
subsidiaries ensures a more integrative approach and collaborations. 
 
This result shows that when the costs of the bargaining process are higher than the price 
which a player offers, then the player needs to reconsider a margin to make up for longer 
bargaining processes. This decision is costly. The short-term perspective of a linear-active 
negotiator results in pre-mature acceptance at a point when the reactive would continue to 
negotiate to build a relationship and trust. Finally, the negotiation constructs - first offer, 
strategy and length of negotiations - lead to a positive outcome when the first offer as 
reflection of the cultural type includes the margin of 20% to provide the basis for trust, 
patience, integrative style and cooperation.  
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5.2. Empirical Implications  
 
This article’s analysis stresses the importance of patience in international negotiations. 
The analysis shows the correlation of patience with a win-win strategy and high initial offer. 
The empirical results support the theoretical framework and show the potential of a 
cooperative solution as a function of patience, win-win strategy and the adaptation of a player 
to an international counterpart. The first offer including a margin of +20% reflects a longer 
time horizon.  
 
Of all relevant cases, six cases have a joint set of all conditions with a consistency of 0.96; 
furthermore there are three cases with international strategy and patience leading to the 
outcome with a consistency of 0.91. The fsQCA results show that the joint set of patience, 
international strategy and win-win strategy is necessary and sufficient to lead to an initial 
offer with a 20% margin. This pattern matches the reactive negotiation approach.  
 
The contribution of this research lies in empirical evidence supporting the theoretical 
analysis that reactive cultures will hold out longer to cover their costs of relationship-building 
with a higher initial offer. Negotiators from cultures who do not accommodate to a reactive 
approach do not have their bargaining costs covered and are much more likely to be impatient 
and to pre-maturely end otherwise successful negotiations.  
 
The article uses data of HQ-subsidiary negotiations in a Japanese MNE. Such data are 
usually difficult to get access to. The analysis of these data with fsQCA supports the 
proposed theory. A long-term orientation, a cooperative approach and a high first offer 
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clearly lead to a cooperative outcome of international negotiations in a reactive-dominated 
MNE environment. These results can support and lead to a better understanding in 
international negotiations with different cultural types. 
 
Negotiation analysis and fuzzy set QCA show that they can scientifically test international 
negotiation behavior in an organizational context of MNE interactions and negotiations.  
 
18 
 
References 
Davis, G.F., Morrill, Hayagreeva, R. & Soule, S.A. (2008). Introduction: Social movements 
in organizations and markets, Administrative Science Quarterly, 53, 389-394.  
Geckhamer, T. (2011). Cross-cultural Differences in Compensation Level and Inequality 
across Occupations: A Set-theoretic Analysis, Organization Studies, 22, 85-115. 
Graham, J.L. (1987). A theory of interorganizational negotiations, Research in Marketing 9, 
Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
Graham, J.L., Mintu, A. & Rodgers, W. (1994). Explorations of negotiation behaviour in 10 
foreign cultures using a model developed in the United States, Management Science 40, 
72-95.  
Harzing, A.W. & Sorge, A. (2003). The relative impact of country of origin and universal 
contingencies on internationalization strategies and corporate control in Multinational 
Enterprises: Worldwide and European perspective, Organization Studies, 24(2), 187-214.  
Kvist, J. (2007). Fuzzy set ideal type analysis. Journal of Business Research, 60, 474-481. 
Lewis, R. (2006). When cultures collide, London: Nicholas Brealey Publishing. 
Liu, A.L, Friedman, R., Barry, B., Gelfand, M. & Zhan, Z-X. (2012). The Dynamics of 
consensus building in intracultural and intercultural negotiations, Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 57, 269-304. 
Ott, U. F. (2011). The Influence of Cultural Activity Types on Buyer-Seller Negotiations - A 
Game Theoretic Framework for International Negotiations, International Negotiation, 
16(3), 427-450. 
Pajunen, K. (2008). Institutions and inflows of foreign direct investment: a fuzzy set analysis, 
Journal of International Business Studies, 39, 652-669. 
Palmer, D. (2006). Taking stock of the criteria we use to evaluate one another’s work:ASQ 
50 years out, Administrative Science Quarterly, 51, 535-559. 
 
19 
 
Putnam, L. (2004). Dialectical tensions and rhetorical tropes in negotiations, Organization 
Studies, 25(1), 35-53. 
Raiffa, H. (1982). The art and science of negotiation, Cambridge, MA: Belknap. 
Ragin, C.C. (2008). Redesigning Social Inquiry, Fuzzy sets and beyond. University Press of 
Chicago: Chicago and London. 
Ragin, C.C. (2000). Fuzzy Set Social Science. Chicago: University of Chicago. 
Ragin, C.C. (1994). Constructing Social Research: The Unity and Diversity of Method.” Pine 
Forge Press.  
Ragin, C.C. (1987). The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative 
Strategies. University of California Press. 
Rihoux, B & Ragin, C.C. (Eds). (2009). Configurational Comparative Methods: Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques, Applied Social Research Methods 
Series, Vol 51.  
Salacuse, J.W. (1999). Intercultural negotiations in international business, Group Decision 
and Negotiations, 8, 217-236. 
Schneider, M. R., Schulze-Bentrop, C & Paunescu M. (2010). Mapping institutional capital 
of high-tech firms: A fuzzy set analysis of capitalist variety and export performance, 
Journal of International Business Studies, 41, 246-266. 
Woodside, A.  Hsu, S.-Y., & Marshall, R. (2011). General theory of cultures‘ consequences 
on international tourism behavior, Journal of Business Research, 64, 785-799. 
Woodside, A. & Zhang, M. (2013). Cultural diversity and marketing transactions: Are market 
integration, large community size and world religions necessary for fairness in ephemeral 
exchanges? Psychology and Marketing, 30 (3), 263-276. 
 
20 
 
 
TABLES: 
Table 1: Reactive MNE Negotiator with Linear-active and Multi-active counterpart in 
subsidiaries 
  Subsidiary 
 
Headquarter 
Subsidiary (Player II) 
 
Linear-active               Multi-active          Re-activeCulture 
      
 
Linear-active  
culture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HQ 
(Player I)  
 
 
 
   
      Multi-active  
culture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            Reactive  
Culture 
Similar cultural 
background with  
refinements  
Scenario1 
‘Time is Money’ – 
Approach 
 
Example: 
American HQ – 
German Subsidiary 
)();(( LL UU δδ  
 
HQ linear-active 
and Subsidiary  
multi-active 
Scenario 4 
 
 
 
Example:  
American HQ– 
Brazilian Subs 
)();(( ML UU δδ  
HQ linear-active and 
Subsidiary reactive 
Scenario 5 
 
 
 
 
Example:  
American HQ– 
Japanese Subsidiary 
)();(( RL UU δδ  
HQ multi-active and 
Subsidiary linear- 
active 
Scenario 6 
 
Example:  
Brazilian HQ – 
American 
Subsidiary  
)();(( LM UU δδ  
 
 
Similar cultural 
background with 
refinements  
Scenario 2 
‘Haggling’-
Approach 
 
Example: 
Brazilian HQ – 
Italian Subsidiary 
)();(( MM UU δδ  
HQ multi-active and 
Subsidiary reactive 
Scenario 7 
Example:  
Brazilian HQ – 
Japanese Subsidiary 
 
 
)();(( RM UU δδ  
HQ reactive and 
Subsidiary  
Linear-active 
Scenario 8 
 
Example: Japanese 
HQ – American 
Subsidiary 
)();(( LR UU δδ  
HQ reactive 
and Subsidiary 
Multi-active 
Scenario 9 
 
Example: Japanese 
HQ – Brazilian 
Subsidiary 
)();(( MR UU δδ  
Similar cultural 
background with 
refinement 
Scenario 3 
‘Building trust’-
Approach 
 
Example: Japanese HQ 
– Finnish Subsidiary 
)();(( RR UU δδ  
 
Source: Adapted to MNE relationship from Ott (2011) 
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Table 2: Break-points for calibration 
 
Variable (and 
label) 
Definition for coding and Role 
in theoretical model 
Coding gradations Breakpoints 
Win-win strategy 
WINWIN 
The strategy is one condition 
which is a common feature of 
Japanese negotiation styles and 
explains the length of 
negotiations 
0 none,  
0.2 flat hierarchy 
0.5 mid level  
0.8 hierarchical, 
1 fully  
0.25; 0.5; 0.8 
Adaptation to 
international 
strategy 
INTSTRAT 
This part of a reactive style 
assumes that the Japanese 
negotiator behaves differently in 
International negotiations than 
in domestic negotiations 
0 none,  
0.25 collectivist 
0.5 mid level,  
0.8 individualist 
1 high  
0.25; 0.5; 0.8 
Patience 
PAT 
Patience is consequence of 
Japanese long bargaining 
horizon  
0 none,  
0.2 femininity, 
0.5 mid level,  
0.8 masculinity 
1 high  
0.25; 0.5; 0.8 
Bargaining 
process starting 
with a high offer 
of  20% 
PR 
FOFFREA 
 
The initial price PR is a function 
of patience displayed over the 
bargaining horizon, the co-
operative strategy and an 
international strategy to cover 
costs of negotiating. 
0 none,  
0.2 femininity, 
0.5 mid level,  
0.8 masculinity 
1 high  
0.25; 0.5; 0.8 
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Table 3: Truthtable First Offer = f( win-win, int. strategy, patience) 
    
 
    
win-
win int.strat patience number 
first 
offer 
reactive 
raw 
consist. 
PRI 
consist. 
SYM 
consist 
0 0 1 1 1 0.97 0.96 0.96 
1 1 1 6 1 0.96 0.94 0.96 
0 1 1 3 1 0.92 0.84 0.86 
1 0 1 3 1 0.81 0.65 0.75 
        
 
Table 4: Truth table Analysis - (complex, parsimonious, intermediate solutions) 
 
                 raw        unique                
                coverage     coverage   consistency   
               ----------   ----------  ----------    
~win-win   0.45      0.04      0.90  
~patience    0.35     0.02  0.96  
int.strat       0.69     0.26    0.86  
solution coverage: 0.80  
solution consistency: 0.87   
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Table 5: sufficient and necessary outcome: first offer = f(win-win, adapt, patience) 
  
                                                  raw 
                                  consistency  coverage combined    
                                  ----------    ----------   ----------    
win-win* int.strat *patience      0.96   0.53  0.81  
int.strat*patience               0.90    0.61  0.73  
win-win* int.strat                0.96   0.58  0.72  
win-win*patience                 0.85   0.67  0.74  
int.strat                         0.86   0.69  0.59  
patience                         0.80   0.82  0.60  
win-win                          0.81   0.72  0.58  
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FIGURES: 
 
MNE reactive types  
   Strategy: 
  Patience  Agreement 
Culture Negotiation Style Win-Win Cooperation/Conflict 
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Figure 1: MNE-Subsidiary negotiation concept 
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Figure 2: Reactive MNE negotiates with LMR host 
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Figure 3: XY plots for necessary and sufficiency of the joint sets 
 
